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As climate change leads to higher sea levels and stronger storms, many coastal 
cities will be increasingly at risk of a major local disaster destroying homes and 
vital urban infrastructure. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how such a disaster 
can result in displacement of many citizens and how their social connections 
or existing disaster management procedures push them towards other cities, 
where they may settle permanently. Atlanta, as a major population center and 
transportation nexus for the south, should expect to receive high numbers of 
people forced to flee other southern cities in similar scenarios. 
This paper describes Atlanta’s migration shed: which coastal areas typically 
send people to Atlanta, which are at highest risk of future climate change 
impacts, and how many people could leave these areas for Atlanta. The 
analysis includes examinations of disaster and non-disaster migrations and 
sea level rise and storm vulnerability geographies in southern coastal counties. 
The final section consists of recommendations for a reevaluation of disaster 
preparedness considerations from a larger regional perspective.
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Climate change and its relationship to major 
current events such as the drought in the 
western US, the opening of arctic shipping 
lanes, and the rapid melting of significant 
glaciers around the world are hotly debated 
in the media at present. Images of these far-
away places are ubiquitous when climate 
change is referenced. Much less common are 
pictures of our own southeastern coastlines 
where, in many places, major infrastructure 
and dense development sit only a few feet 
above the water. 
As sea levels rise and tropical storms 
strengthen, risk of serious or even 
catastrophic damage from coastal flooding 
or storm surge will increase. Determined 
people and governments will deal with 
the risks as they can, perhaps by moving 
to higher ground if they can afford it or 
by building seawalls to protect important 
areas. Others, however, will decide it’s not 
worth rebuilding after yet another round of 
flooding and will move to a less risky city. 
Some may decide to look for more reliable 
work elsewhere after being laid off from a 
beachfront hotel forced to close for repairs. 
Still more will have to seek new homes in 
other towns after the rental housing they 
had lived in is destroyed in a hurricane and 
never rebuilt.
All these things happen now, of course, but 
climate change will escalate and accelerate 
these processes. Atlanta, as one of the 
Southeast’s only large cities, and with its 
economic, physical, and cultural connections 
to the region, is likely to be the destination 
of choice for many migrants. This project 
seeks to explore three main questions: 
which coastal areas typically send people to 
Atlanta, which are at highest risk of future 
climate change impacts, and how many 
people could leave these areas for Atlanta. 
I propose hurricane-driven migrations as 
a model for future climate migrations in 
the southeast. Based on analysis of past 
migration patterns, a migration shed for 
Atlanta will be projected and sea level 
rise data will be used to project levels of 
displacement of coastal populations.
The goal of this project is to demonstrate 
the importance of local climate-change-
driven migrations to Atlanta planners and 
decision-makers. A better understanding 
of this phenomenon will be useful to those 
projecting Atlanta’s future population, 
economic and community development 
planners, and emergency management 
or disaster response officials. This project 
attempts to predict a hypothetical number of 
migrants in the year 2050 in order to illustrate 
the seriousness of the issue. Every effort 
has been made to produce conservative 
estimates. Only the Southeast is considered; 
a broader geographic approach is outside 
the scope of this project. 
This report begins with a summary of the 
research surrounding the vulnerability of 
Southeastern coastal areas, the relationship 
between climate change and migration, 
and how other cities have handled influxes 
of environmental migrants. A discussion of 
the methods used in the disaster migration 
modeling and the results of the model 
follow. Finally, I make some general policy 
recommendations for the reevaluation of 
disaster preparedness considerations from 
a larger regional perspective and some 
preliminary steps Atlanta could take to 
prepare for displaced persons.
Introduction
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Climate Change and Coastal Vulnerability
Though coastal counties make up less 
than 10% of the US’s total area, in 2010, 
an estimated 39% of the US population 
lived in coastal counties (National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, 2013). 
Along with population, commercial uses 
and earnings are clustered at the coasts. 
Engineering and construction developments 
over time have allowed people to move into 
more difficult or dangerous places and, to 
a certain extent, have enabled some lack of 
concern for environmental limitations. Water 
can be pumped from distant reservoirs; lost 
sand from eroding beaches can be replaced; 
air conditioning can keep buildings cool. 
Environmental management methods such 
as these lead to population growth as they 
make the areas where they are used more 
comfortable, but “the collapse of human 
control in the face of disaster can produce 
sudden and dramatic, though potentially 
only short-term, population loss” (Gutmann, 
M. P. & Field, V., 2010). It is this population 
loss that this report seeks to understand 
further. In the context of long term climate 
change, however, it is uncertain whether the 
displacement can be short term.
Vulnerability refers to a person or group’s 
ability to deal with a negative circumstance. 
In terms of an environmental disaster, like a 
hurricane, as an acute example, or climate 
change, more, broadly, a vulnerable group 
is less able to protect themselves from, deal 
with the impacts from, and recover from a 
disaster (Donner & Rodríguez, 2008). Vul-
nerability can be seen as both physical and 
social. Physically vulnerable places are those 
more prone to serious impacts; visible exam-
ples include barrier islands or concentrated 
development along river banks. These places 
need some level of environmental manage-
ment to make them habitable. Social vul-
nerability is often conceived of through low 
socioeconomic status, non-white race, low 
education level, or other factors which make 
it harder to maintain control over the cir-
cumstances to which one is exposed. There 
can also be a physical element to social 
vulnerability, however, in the characteristics 
of the built environment where people live. 
The quality and reliability of the environ-
mental management systems supporting 
life are often influenced by social factors in 
the community, such as wealth, growth, and 
level of investment (Cutter, Boruff, & Shir-
ley, 2003). Where highly socially vulnerable 
people are concentrated, the risks they face 
from physical vulnerabilities are increased.
Along the Atlantic coastline close to Atlanta, 
physical factors like sea level rise and 
slope contribute the most to vulnerability, 
while social factors play a larger role along 
the Gulf Coast  (Boruff, Emrich, & Cutter, 
2005; Donner & Rodríguez, 2008; National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2013). As climate change brings higher 
sea levels, vulnerability will increase along 
the Atlantic Coast: even those with very 
low social vulnerability will be at increased 
risk. Interventions to deal with physical risk 
factors could reduce overall vulnerability in 
this area (Boruff et al., 2005). On the Gulf, 
physical interventions are less likely to have 
an overall negative impact on vulnerability.
Globally, sea level is expected to rise by 
between one to four feet by 2100 (Walsh, J. 
D., et al., 2014). It will take some time before 
the seawater begins to seriously encroach 
onto land, however. The real risk is related to 
storm surge, a phenomenon where rotation, 
wind, and pressure changes inside a strong 
storm, tropical storm, or hurricane increase 
water levels just around the storm     (Masters, 
n.d.). The force of this water, mostly through 
wave action, is very destructive. Storm surge
Literature Review
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is worst around the eye of a hurricane and 
can mean an increase of 25 feet or more 
above mean high water levels in a particular-
ly strong storm like Hurricane Katrina (Mas-
ters, n.d.). The southeastern US has been in 
a period of high hurricane frequency and 
intensity since the 1980s. By the end of this 
century a slight decrease in the number of 
storms is projected, but hurricane strength 
is expected to increase further (Walsh, J. D., 
et al., 2014). That could mean much more 
destructive storms, with higher storm surge 
levels threatening low-lying areas.
Coastal cities are at greatest risk of severe 
damage related to climate change because 
of concentrated development. Until  fairly re-
cently, land use planning was not connected 
with ideas of local resiliency. Potential storm 
surge levels were not considered when 
many major interstates and bridges were 
designed, nor was inundation likelihood 
projected for sewage stations and water 
treatment plants. Sarasota, Florida has over 
400 sewage lift stations at risk of damage in-
side the category 2 storm surge area, for ex-
ample (Frazier, Wood, & Yarnal, 2010). Pro-
jections show that a category 3 storm could 
flood the major north-south interstate and 
damage or make impassable some bridges, 
complicating rescue, relief, and recovery op-
erations which require those transportation 
links (Frazier et al., 2010).
As was seen during Katrina’s aftermath in 
New Orleans, the poor often live in areas 
of higher flooding risk (Colten, 2006). This 
means they tend to have increased physical 
vulnerability, despite having less capabil-
ity to deal with a disaster and its impacts. 
Further exacerbating social vulnerability are 
gaps in disaster response planning, which 
often does not serve the poor, especially 
immigrants, very well (Donner & Rodríguez, 
2008).
The combination of high levels of social vul-
nerability and the increasing physical vul-
nerability as a result of sea level rise present 
a worrying outlook for the future of much of 
the coastal south. To reduce overall vulnera-
bility, substantial steps would have to be
Miami, Florida
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taken to protect the infrastructure that peo-
ple rely on to support their everyday needs 
– safe housing to water treatment to reliable 
electricity. If these essential services are 
compromised by repeated flooding or dam-
aged in a major storm, continued residence 
in any area becomes more difficult. Without 
these essential services many people will be 
forced to leave, as hurricanes such as Katrina 
and Andrew have shown. Atlanta, less vul-
nerable due to its inland location and unique 
in its size and interconnectedness with other 
southern cities, may be a refuge for many. 
Disaster-Driven Displacement in the  US: 
Examples from Hurricane Katrina
The most obvious example of disaster driven 
displacement in recent US history is Hurri-
cane Katrina. Many people evacuated before 
the storm and many more as the floodwaters 
began rising. Thousands of residents were 
trapped in the city by the floods, only able 
to leave after days spent in the overcrowded 
Superdome or Convention Center or sleep-
ing under highway overpasses. Much of the 
city was destroyed and, across New Orleans 
and the Gulf Coast, millions were left without 
homes. 
Another destructive storm that resulted 
in the displacement of a large number of 
people was Hurricane Andrew, which made 
landfall just south of Miami in 1992. The cost 
of the damage was estimated to be more 
than $22 billion (Smith & McCarty, 1996).
Times-Picayune Map of Katrina Displacement
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New Orleans residents and others from 
hard-hit coastal areas spread out across 
the country after Katrina. In contrast, the 
majority of Hurricane Andrew’s damage was 
isolated to a couple of south Florida coun-
ties and most people stayed close by, often 
in neighboring counties (Smith & McCarty, 
1996).
Many displaced, especially the poor, do not 
get to choose their destination, however. 
People without personal vehicles or who 
cannot afford to drive a great distance, must 
be offered assistance with evacuation trans-
portation (Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Those 
relying on public evacuation transportation 
are often unable to choose their destina-
tions. Stories about Katrina evacuees who 
boarded planes and busses with no idea of 
their destination are common. 
Similarly, these public transportation-reliant 
evacuees are unable to leave the destination 
without further transit assistance, whether 
to return to their home city to another, until 
transportation is offered again or they can 
provide for their own travel. It is common, 
though, that, in the transition from evacuee 
to displaced person, more travel happens. 
After Andrew, displaced families reported 
moving an average of two times before set-
tling back into repaired or new homes. After 
Katrina, African American women moved 
more than any other group before being 
able to settle back into their neighborhoods 
(Li, Airriess, Chen, Leong, & Keith, 2010).
Where Andrew did less damage, people 
were able to return to their homes after a 
couple of weeks. In areas of heavy damage, 
however, most were gone for over 6 months 
and 12.7% for over a year (Smith & McCarty, 
1996). It was found that the people still gone 
at the 2 year point or later were not likely 
to return. Also, the farther away people 
moved initially, the less likely they were to 
return (Smith & McCarty, 1996). The outlook 
on the future of the community is also very 
important for the decision to return home 
or now. After Katrina, in a neighborhood in-
habited by African Americans and a sizable 
Vietnamese community, the Vietnamese 
were quicker to return and more positive 
about the future of the neighborhood (Li et 
al., 2010).
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, many people 
could not return quickly. Thousands ended 
up far from home, in South Carolina or Colo-
rado for example, and, knowing that the city 
could not be rebuilt very quickly, resigned 
themselves to staying in their new cities for 
some time. They rented apartments, looked 
for jobs, and enrolled their kids in local 
schools. While some did this with hope for 
a new start and others with longing for their 
old lives, most understood there was little 
alternative (Weber & Peek, 2012). But many 
of the receiving cities were not prepared to 
take on these displaced persons and much 
of the assistance structure was insufficient.
Housing issues were seen across the board. 
Different assistance programs had different 
benefits, requirements, and timelines. This 
lead to confusion for the displaced and local 
landlords centered around where the money 
would come from and prejudices about HUD 
funding (Lein, L., et al., 2012; Pardee, Jessica, 
2012). Also, as the displaced streamed in, 
demand for housing in migration cities 
drove up rental prices but HUD voucher 
values were not adjusted accordingly. Many 
of the displaced struggled to find housing 
options they could afford (Pardee, Jessica, 
2012). Differences state-to-state made other 
social assistance programs, such as Medicare 
and food stamps, difficult to navigate for the 
displaced. Missing IDs and other personal 
records slowed enrollment (Lein, L., et al., 
2012). 
Many former New Orleans residents were 
also surprised by the lower assistance levels
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offered in other states and found it hard to 
make ends meet in the way they had been 
accustomed to at home (Lein, L., et al., 2012; 
Weber, Lynn, 2012). Transportation issues 
were very common for the displaced who 
had very low car ownership levels but who 
were moved, in many cases, to much more 
sprawling cities than New Orleans with 
much more limited public transportation. 
Among other things, this made looking for 
and keeping work difficult for many (Weber, 
Lynn, 2012).
These problems were partially due to the 
lack of recognition of displacement in US 
law. Complaints against the US disaster relief 
law, commonly known as the Stafford Act, 
have been raised since Hurricane Katrina. 
This law does not recognize disaster recov-
ery as a federal responsibility and does not 
require the federal government to provide 
any standard of assistance. Critics argue that 
this Act leaves US citizens deprived of their 
rights to assistance and recovery as laid out 
by the UN and other human rights organiza-
tions (Advocates for Environmental Human 
Rights, et al., 2010). There is no current US 
legal structure that defines internal displace-
ment or which sets out actions to respond to 
displacement (Stephens & Reide, 2006).
Ultimately, many of the displaced felt stig-
matized and discriminated against, partially 
because of racism and partially because of 
ideas of refugees as backwards, unintelligent, 
or criminal (Peek, Lori, 2012). Resentment 
was high in many receiving cities as well, 
where the welcome wore thin rather quickly 
as the displaced were no longer seen as 
people in need of assistance but, instead, as 
outsiders taking up local resources (Weber 
& Peek, 2012). The displaced, on the other 
hand, felt isolated from their culture, friends, 
and way of life (Weber, Lynn, 2012).
Planners and other decision makers in the 
Katrina destination cities did not anticipate 
the influx of the displaced that awaited them 
after Katrina. National assistance programs 
offered some limited solutions for people, 
but the situation on the ground in different 
states and cities caused unexpected prob-
lems. In addition, federal and local assistance 
systems became increasingly ill-suited to the 
needs of the displaced as the months after 
the storm stretched into years. Frustration 
grew on both sides: among the displaced, 
who hadn’t wanted to leave New Orleans 
and felt trapped in new places, and among 
the receiving communities, which had little 
desire to support the needs of outsiders 
who didn’t want to be there.
People forced to leave their homes have dif-
ferent needs than those who move to a city 
for a new job, for example. Even if they choose 
their destination, they may be unprepared 
to build a new life there from scratch. Cities 
like Atlanta, in insulated inland positions but 
not far from the coast, understand they will 
occasionally shelter coastal citizens because 
of hurricanes. Climate change threatens to 
make these brief displacements permanent. 
Connecting Climate Change to Displacement
The increase in climate change related 
natural disasters that require people to flee 
their homes means there are likely to be 
more displaced persons in the future. Many 
of these people will come from low-lying 
coastal regions, as encroaching sea water 
increases flooding risks and storm damage 
and seeps into soil and groundwater. Some 
climate change adaptation and mitigation 
measures will also lead to displacement, for 
instance where the choice is made to retreat 
from a coastal plain rather than defend it 
with sea walls and pumps. Much of the ex-
isting literature considers climate displace-
ment globally, in general terms about mass 
migrations from threatened areas. 
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The places and peoples under consideration 
are, for the most part, in developing coun-
tries and it is the necessity of planning for 
these high risk, low resource populations 
that is discussed.           
At the international level, an important facet 
of the discussion of this issue is how to clas-
sify those people forced to move. Under the 
framework by which the UN currently rec-
ognizes refugees, in order for an individual 
to be considered a refugee, they must have 
a fear of persecution on the grounds of their 
“race, religion, nationality, or membership 
of a particular social group or political opin-
ion” and have migrated to another country 
to escape it (1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol, 
in de Sherbinin et al., 2011). This definition 
is clearly shaped around political refugees, 
those fleeing a war, political upheaval, reli-
gious conflicts, etc. 
Though many have pushed for the inclusion 
of environmental issues, such as drought, 
as drivers of displacement, this has not yet 
happened. Critics of the idea feel that an 
environmental issue is not usually the sole 
or even main reason for flight and that, if it 
were, people would only need leave tempo-
rarily and would return home soon enough 
(de Sherbinin et al., 2011). The general belief 
is that political upheaval and state misman-
agement are the ultimate causes of refugee 
movements, regardless of underlying en-
vironmental issues. Thus, those forced to 
leave their homes due to the environmental 
impacts of climate change are considered 
displaced persons (Albuja & Adarve, 2011; 
de Sherbinin et al., 2011).
The internally displaced, i.e. those who remain 
within the boundaries of their home coun-
try, are considered at the international level. 
Human rights groups and formal commis-
sions have recognized the risk that disasters 
pose and have found that countries should 
protect their citizens from disasters and dis-
placement (Albuja & Adarve, 2011). The UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
lay out the rights of the internally displaced, 
including that displacement should not be 
“arbitrary,” that they should be protected 
from conflict and discrimination, that they 
should be free to move about the country 
or seek asylum elsewhere, that they should 
be provided with food, housing, healthcare, 
and other essentials, and that they should 
be “protected against forcible return to or 
resettlement in any place where their life, 
safety, liberty, and/or health would be at 
risk” (United Nations, 2004). Natural disas-
ters, though not climate change specifically, 
are recognized as a cause of displacement. 
The extent to which the legal frameworks, 
at any level, recognize “slow-onset disas-
ters induced by climate change, such as 
droughts or depletion of resources” as 
drivers of displacement and, therefore, the 
people fleeing as officially displaced is un-
clear (Thomas, 2014). As the environmental 
problems unfold slowly, migration from the 
area may be seen as a voluntary, economic 
decision rather than forced movement 
(Thomas, 2014). In these scenarios, it is likely 
that people would lack legal protections 
(Albuja & Adarve, 2011). Also, the nature of 
slow but irrevocable change complicates the 
idea of displacement as temporary. The UN 
Guiding Principles state that the displace-
ment should “last no longer than required 
by the circumstances” (United Nations, 
2004). When circumstances prohibit the 
return of displaced people, it is unclear how 
they should be considered. 
Some scholars differentiate displacement 
due to development and displacement due 
to disaster, though much of the difference 
seems to relate to the extent to which the 
displacement was anticipated and whether a 
return to the status quo is the goal, or even 
an option, of response efforts (Berringer, 
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2011; Wilmsen & Webber, 2015). Increas-
ingly, however, scholars are recognizing 
that climate change blurs the lines between 
these advance planning and emergency re-
sponse approaches and are advocating for 
a model that combines the two (Berringer, 
2011). Research tends to discuss migration 
and resettlement outcomes separately, 
favoring migration as it offers substantially 
more agency, such as choice in timing and 
destination, than forced resettlement (de 
Sherbinin et al., 2011; Farquhar, 2014; Wilm-
sen & Webber, 2015). 
The result of several international meetings 
on the subject  has so far been that forced 
resettlement because of development can 
offer guidelines and lessons to those plan-
ning for climate resettlement, but there is 
general agreement that it is a last resort, 
meant for those “unable to adapt in situ 
or migrate” (Wilmsen & Webber, 2015). It 
should not be overlooked that “pre-emp-
tive” migration also suits receiving countries 
well, as it allows them a greater element of 
control over the influx of people (Farquhar, 
2014). 
Displacement is more likely to be seen from 
more heavily damaged places, especially 
where there is damage to residences, and 
the people from these places are likely to 
be displaced for longer periods of time (L. 
Perch-Nielsen, B. Bättig, & Imboden, 2008; 
Smith & McCarty, 1996). People in these 
situations are already less likely to return, 
and that chance shrinks even further if work 
options are impacted or if migration was 
already happening (L. Perch-Nielsen et al., 
2008). It is at this point that the lines be-
tween displacement and migration become 
blurred. 
With no formal designation at the interna-
tional level or within the US, there is no stan-
dard for the support of and provision for the 
long-term displaced. Lack of clear process 
and requirements will not prevent them 
from seeking refuge, however. Similarly, 
what impact climate-change-driven in-mi-
gration could have on local planning, which 
has focused for the most part on economic 
drivers, is unknown. Ultimately, without fur-
ther progress on this front, future receiving 
cities, like Atlanta, will set the example of 
best (and worst) practice integration of the 
displaced and climate migrants.
Facing Climate Change at our Doorstep
In an overview of existing attempts made 
at climate migration modeling, McLeman 
(2013) was unable to find any work previous 
to the early 2000s. Since that time, research-
ers have experimented with various meth-
ods of modelling climate-driven migration, 
focusing overwhelmingly on out-migration. 
This starts with an identified environmental 
driver, such as crop changes, or, in the case 
of multi-hazard analyses, another life event 
that could spur migration (McLeman, 2013). 
Most have struggled to expand the scale of 
models beyond the regional level, as access 
to or specificity of data on migrant popu-
lations at national or international levels is 
often lacking (McLeman, 2013). Uncertainty 
remains about the exact numbers of migrants 
and the extent to which projections rooted 
in very specific situations can be made more 
broadly applicable (Findlay, 2011). 
Instead of beginning with the migrants, 
this project will look at the issue from the 
perspective of the destination. Though the 
number of migrants and the context of fu-
ture migrations are uncertain, what is not is 
the fact that they will come. As Allan Findlay 
writes: “A pre-occupation with forecasting a 
single number of environmental movers has 
diverted attention from thinking…about how 
to plan for the impacts at different migration 
destinations in relation to the multiple and
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complex ways in which environmental mi-
gration is, and will be, produced” (Findlay, 
2011). Additionally, migration discussions 
that begin with the drivers lend themselves 
best to solutions that begin with drivers as 
well, which, though important, are more 
significant in terms of sending community 
rather than receiving community adaptation.
The destination first approach allows a po-
tential receiving city to embrace uncertainty 
to some extent and incorporate higher or 
lower migrant numbers into future scenario 
planning processes. In one example, Abel 
and his collaborators attempted to predict 
future environmentally-driven migration to 
the UK with a Bayesian statistical analysis 
based on a Delphi study of migration and 
demography experts. The migrants in ques-
tion were international newcomers to the 
UK and experts were asked first to predict 
future totals, then to discuss and defend 
their predictions to the full panel, with the 
option to change their final prediction (Abel, 
Bijak, Findlay, McCollum, & Wiśniowski, 
2013). Predictions were also assigned a 
level of uncertainty, allowing a kind of fan 
of possible values to be forecasted – though 
this is not to be confused with the statistical 
reliability of a confidence interval (Abel et 
al., 2013). 
Results, following the median output, show 
an overall decline in in-migration to the 
UK and an initial increase in environmental 
migration followed up by a slight decline 
by 2060 (Abel et al., 2013). Allowing for the 
provided uncertainty levels, the estimates 
vary widely: from 600 to 177,700 environ-
mental migrants in 2030 and from 600 to 
312,700 migrants in 2060 (Abel et al., 2013). 
This variation can be explained in large part 
by differing expert opinions on the origin 
countries of potential migrants and the 
comparative attractiveness of the UK as a 
destination. 
Though it is not the central focus of the paper, 
the authors suggest policy makers should 
strive to better understand what features 
may make the UK a more or less attractive 
destination in the future which can offer “an 
early warning” of migrant flows or inspire 
development investments in more attractive 
places (Abel et al., 2013). This furthers the 
idea that cities should see themselves as 
part of a larger migration system where 
they are one of many migration destination 
options. As circumstances change who may 
be most likely to choose a particular city 
as a destination, thorough understanding 
of migrant characteristics and needs will 
increase preparedness. Attractiveness to mi-
grants can also be a goal, especially as they 
can potentially fill labor gaps or spur growth 
(Harper, 2012).
As this report focuses on Atlanta and the 
southeastern US, it is migration in the context 
of the developed world that is the closest 
parallel. The European Union’s Demographic 
and Migratory Flows Affecting European 
Regions and Cities project (DEMIFER) 
commissioned a report on climate change 
and migration which concludes that cli-
mate-driven internal migration is unlikely in 
Europe as adequate adaptive infrastructure 
development is assumed (European Spatial 
Planning Observation Network, 2010). Ob-
viously, further information about migrants 
was not provided. 
In the US, even in the National Climate 
Assessment, discussion of migration mostly 
concerns plant and animal species and 
relocation of humans is mentioned only in 
relationship to low-lying Pacific islands (US 
Global Change Research Program, 2014). Ac-
ademic research in the field consists mainly 
of identifications of vulnerable groups and 
high risk areas, as discussed in the previ-
ous section on vulnerability. Cutter’s social 
vulnerability index has, for example, been 
combined with sea level rise, land use, and 
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land value data to perform a cost benefit 
analysis that maps coastal areas most and 
least likely to be protected with sea walls 
or other physical interventions (Martinich, 
Neumann, Ludwig, & Jantarasami, 2013). 
Though the risk factors that lead to the 
conclusion that some areas are more likely 
to be abandoned are clearly defined, no 
further analysis of where the residents will 
go is provided. 
Resettlement due to climate change or 
adaptation or mitigation projects is also a 
popular subject (de Sherbinin et al., 2011; 
Ferris, 2015; Johnson, 2012; Wilmsen & 
Webber, 2015). The debate surrounding cli-
mate resettlement is an interesting one, but, 
at least in terms of the development forced 
resettlement model, speaks, again, more to 
large-scale, international issues where the 
UN and other large organizations can inter-
vene and act to move people. 
Organized relocation has only been dis-
cussed in the US in relationship to some 
indigenous groups living on threatened is-
lands or river deltas (Kan, 2015; Maldonado, 
Shearer, Bronen, Peterson, & Lazrus, 2013; 
Thomas, 2014). Action on resettlement for 
these groups has been hindered by the 
mismatch of the current government disas-
ter-response framework and the need for 
preemptive movement. There is no specific 
funding set aside to relocate people and no 
designated responsible agency (Maldonado 
et al., 2013). 
It would require substantial political up-
heaval in the US for an outside organization, 
like the UN, or even the Federal government 
to step in and forcibly move a large number 
of people to a new location. Though some 
possible examples do exist from our past, 
any climate-change-related actions at such 
a scale seem unlikely under the current 
political context. As it is impossible to fore-
cast such broad shifts, this project focuses 
mainly on migrant movements rather than 
resettlement.
Drawing on the larger migration literature, 
Findlay suggests that the central features 
of environmental migration are movements 
over short distances and reliance on social 
networks (Findlay, 2011). Urban destinations 
are particularly attractive because of the 
prevalence of these networks and improved 
economic chances, though long-distance 
or international migration is still limited to 
those who have more personal resources. 
The poor may want to travel farther but tend 
to stay in the first available location with the 
opportunity to find secure work and living 
space (Findlay, 2011). A study of US house-
hold movements shows some evidence 
that extreme weather, even when not at a 
disaster level, may drive migrants to urban 
destinations (Cameron, Saif, & Duquette, 
2011). It is not surprising that urban areas, 
with more diversified work and living op-
tions and dense social networks, would be 
preferred destinations. 
Of particular interest for this project is the 
line that separates displaced persons and 
migrants. It seems to lie in the timing of 
the situation: as long as return home seems 
possible or is desired, people are only tem-
porarily displaced but, once they desire to 
leave the threatened area or not to return to 
it, they become migrants. As is seen in the 
examples from New Orleans’ displaced, it is 
not always this simple. While return home 
may be technically possible, it may not be 
realistic due to lack of transportation, jobs, 
or fundamental changes at home like the 
drastic spike in rental costs in New Orleans 
after Katrina (Weber & Peek, 2012). 
And this exception rather proves the rule, 
as it stands now, that displacement is seen 
as a problem for ‘others.’ In the same way 
that many in receiving cities had a hard time 
empathizing with those displaced because 
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of Katrina, the United States has not yet come 
to terms with the fact that disasters due to 
climate change will not happen only in some 
isolated far-away place.  In this we are not 
alone, as the omission of climate change 
drivers from refugee frameworks shows the 
refusal to accept the scale of the coming 
problems or, with a slightly more sinister 
view, the refusal to accept the displaced. Mi-
grants can be turned away, refugees cannot 
(de Sherbinin et al., 2011). 
Currently, research on climate-driven mi-
gration and displacement in the US is just 
getting started. Much of this work focuses 
on the sending communities: what are the 
risks and who are the most vulnerable. 
Migrant destination choice research shows 
that people are likely to choose urban des-
tinations close to home where they have 
some social connections. These two threads 
have not been combined to forecast where 
potential climate migrants may end up 
in the future, at least in the US. While this 
project is not able to explore that question 
on a broad scale, the goal is to contribute 
predictions for one city. This report will take 
a destination-centered approach for Atlanta, 
Georgia with the aim of creating a climate 
migration shed for the city, identifying areas 
of strong social and physical connection and 
the populations that may be most likely to 
leave them for Atlanta.
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Three related research questions drive this 
project: which coastal areas typically send 
people to Atlanta, which are at highest 
risk of future climate change impacts, and 
how many people could leave these areas 
for Atlanta. An examination of the existing 
migration relationships between Atlanta 
and its southeastern coastal neighbors and 
some simple population growth estimates 
were used to help answer the first and last 
questions. GIS analysis of sea level rise sce-
narios and the geography of coastal areas 
was used to tackle the second question. 
This section describes these methods and 
their application for this project; results are 
discussed later.
As a benchmark, 2050 was selected as the 
goal year for this analysis. Current projec-
tions estimate up to four feet of sea level 
rise by 2100 (Walsh, J. D., et al., 2014), though 
the rate of progress of the rise is unclear. The 
year 2050 presents a time point in which sea 
level rise and its effects are likely to be wide-
spread, but not catastrophic. At less than 35 
years away, this time point is not so distance 
as to be unimaginable and people’s daily 
lives and needs are likely to be relatively 
similar to the present. 
Migration Relationships
In order to better understand the coastal mi-
gration shed for the Atlanta region, the first 
step was to understand what migration to 
and from Atlanta and nearby coastal coun-
ties has looked like in recent years. Referred 
to here as the migration relationship, this 
speaks to the relative level of connection, 
in terms of out-moving residents, between 
a coastal county and the Atlanta area and 
the associated contribution to Atlanta’s 
in-moving migration totals. Most useful to 
the analysis is the outmigration share: the 
ratio of those leaving a county for the Atlan-
ta region to the total of all out-movers from 
that county. A high outmigration share indi-
cates a strong sending relationship between 
a county and the Atlanta region. 
Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income 
(IRS SOI) data were used to calculate these 
values. These data record the number of 
income tax return filers each year at the 
state and county level, how many have 
moved since their previous years’ filing, and 
where they moved to. These data provide a 
high level of accuracy in tracking migration 
movements because it is collected every 
year and for all tax filers, and they are gen-
erally recognized as a high quality source 
for internal migration information (Curtis, 
Fussell, & DeWaard, 2015). For a finer level 
of detail and increased accuracy, the county 
migration totals were used in this analysis.
Migration numbers taken from the SOI data 
tend to be conservative for several reasons. 
First, many older citizens and many of the 
very poor, who are not required to file 
taxes, do not do so, and, therefore, are not 
accounted for. Also, totals lower than ten 
are suppressed to protect movers’ identi-
ties. Therefore, for each county, only those 
counties which sent or received at least 10 
filers are listed. That means, in this analysis, 
counties sending or receiving fewer than 10 
individuals from any of the Atlanta region’s 
counties received a zero value. 
Thus, especially among counties with very 
low migration flows, the calculated migra-
tion share may be lower than the true value. 
It is also important to note that the SOI data 
collection methodology was changed after 
2010 to improve accuracy. From the 2011-
2012 year and on, the data include improved 
return matching methods and a full year
Methods
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of returns. Previous to this, only returns 
received before September were included in 
migration totals (Pierce, 2015). 
From the most recent year of data available 
(2012-2013) and the previous ten years, 
county-to-county migration flow data were 
examined for coastal counties in Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana (only the New 
Orleans area), Mississippi, and South Caroli-
na. Counties were considered coastal if they 
border the ocean or a large bay or sound; 
that is coastal counties are those one deep 
from the coastline, determined visually. 
Due to their distance from Atlanta and, in 
the case of New Orleans, the confounding 
factor of levee construction on the SLR im-
pacts, Mississippi and Louisiana were later 
excluded. 
For each county, total numbers of people 
moving were collected from IRS SOI files 
for the 10 years between 2013 and 2003. 
This included the total number of out-mi-
grants from each county, of in-migrants to 
the Atlanta region, and of out-migrants from 
each county to each Atlanta regional county. 
For the purposes of this project, the Atlanta 
region was defined according to the MSA 
boundaries used by the US Census Bureau 
for the 2000 decennial census. 
This allowed an outmigration share to be 
calculated for each county. Applying only the 
outmigration share to estimate migration 
relationship favors counties with a strong 
sending relationship with Atlanta, those 
which tend to have higher numbers of peo-
ple moving to the Atlanta region. However, 
there are zero values for some counties that 
did not send at least ten people to Atlanta 
in any single year. Though it is possible that 
these counties did send some people to the 
Atlanta region, they cannot be counted with 
this method. 
Therefore, the outmigration share as cal-
culated here underestimates the coastal 
county to Atlanta sending relationship. Still, 
the value calculated is a strong predictor of 
the business as usual migration connection 
and provides a simple measure of where 
new incomers to the region, especially from 
higher population counties, tend to move 
from.
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Population Projections
In order to calculate a number of potentially 
displaced people in 2050, population esti-
mates for each county in 2050 were needed. 
Most state governments or other planning 
organizations have not yet forecasted future 
populations that far into the future, though, 
so a simple linear method was used to create 
2050 population projections. The population 
estimates for each of the 50 counties in 2010 
and 1970 were collected from the Census 
Bureau and a growth factor was calculated 
by dividing the 2010 population by the 
1970 population. This is essentially the rate 
of growth for each county across the forty 
years before 2010. Across all fifty counties, 
this growth factor ranged from 21.5% for 
Flagler County, Florida, to 1.3% for Mobile 
County, Alabama. To project populations in 
2050, the 2010 population was then multi-
plied by the forty year growth factor.
This process assumes that the growth rate 
over the 40 years between 2010 and 1970 
will remain the same from 2010 to 2050. For 
many counties, especially in Florida, which 
have seen extremely high growth rates over 
the past 40 years, this assumption is likely to 
be incorrect. It is probable that, as climate 
change and sea level rise move out of the 
politically debated sphere they currently 
inhabit in our national public discourse and 
into the real, lived experience of coastal 
citizens, fewer people may choose to move 
to coastal counties and some current resi-
dents may even choose to move out before 
impacts become widespread. 
Still, considering the lack of urgency with 
which these issues are discussed by poli-
cy-makers and the absence, in most cases, 
of barriers or disincentives to coastal devel-
opment, it is also quite possible that growth 
rates will remain high well into the future. In 
any case, projecting how these growth rates 
may change in the future for each county 
was outside the scope of this project. In the 
interest of preparation, the estimates based 
on past growth were used with the idea that 
planning for a greater number of displaced 
persons will improve readiness. 
As census tract level data on populations 
was used for the GIS analysis, the population 
of individual tracts was projected for 2050 
wherever possible by multiplying the given 
2010 tract population by the linear growth 
factor for its county. For Florida’s five south-
ernmost counties, for which tract level SLR 
analysis was not possible, the growth factor 
was applied to the overall county popula-
tion.
In order to compare the sea level rise migrant 
group to the expected in-migration from 
the coastal counties, Atlanta’s 2049-2050 
total in-migration needed to be estimated. 
Using a line of best fit to the ten years of 
IRS SOI migration data already collected, 
in-migration in Atlanta was estimated at ap-
proximately 319,748 people. This indicates a 
growth rate of about 1.52% from the current 
situation, using the mean of the in-migra-
tion totals available. The estimated total 
in-migration was multiplied by each coun-
ty’s Atlanta migration share to estimate a 
number of migrants who may be anticipated 
and for whom, through standard planning 
and development practices, the region may 
already be prepared. 
Figure 1 shows the expected incoming 
migrants by decade from the fifty county 
study area and the total of all expected 
in-migrants from this area by 2050. From 
2013 to 2050, approximately 500,000 of 
the Atlanta region’s incoming migrants are 
expected to come from these counties, 
assuming their respective shares of Atlanta’s 
in-migration remain the same in the future. 
This represents about 4.7% of the total of all 
incoming migrants to the Atlanta region.
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GIS Analysis
This project concerns itself not only with 
those displaced due to actual inundation 
but also those who are pushed to move 
due to nuisance issues related to SLR, such 
as frequent flooding. While it is unlikely 
that someone living six feet above current 
sea level would be inundated by 2050, they 
would certainly be at much higher risk of 
damage from flooding or storm surge and 
much of the infrastructure they rely on, like 
roads, would also be threatened. 
To compare areas where risk of these SLR-re-
lated impacts will increase, the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Association’s (NOAA) 
sea level rise GIS data were downloaded 
from the Digital Coast open data website 
and clipped to the Alabama, Florida, Geor-
gia, and South Carolina coastal counties. 
NOAA’s mean higher high water inundation 
files (polygon) were used to calculate areas 
of inundation at 0ft SLE (present day), 4ft 
SLR (the 2100 estimate), and 6ft SLR. The 
use of both inundation scenarios provides 
a high and low risk of migration estimate, 
assuming that those closer to sea level are 
more likely to migrate even before their land 
is inundated because of increased overall 
flooding risk (Sweet & Park, 2014).
At the scale of the full study area, the details 
of these SLR scenarios are difficult to make 
out. Figure 2 shows a view of the Georgia 
coast with the different inundation areas 
and the locations and population sizes of 
coastal towns and cities. 
NOAA’s SLR polygons were overlaid with 
2010 census tract boundaries, obtained 
from the US Census Bureau. Tracts under 
consideration were limited to those in the 
coastal counties for which migration data 
was calculated. Especially in cases of river 
deltas, SLR will encroach farther inland than 
this first line of coastal counties, but land 
loss was not calculated farther inland as 
migration data was not collected for these 
areas.
Figure 1: Expected In-Migrants from the Fifty Coastal Counties
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ArcGIS’s identity and dissolve tools were 
used to calculate and compare the percent 
of each tract covered by water in all three SLR 
scenarios. The identity tool combines the 
census tract boundaries and the boundaries 
of the inundation area and allows only those 
portions of tracts within the inundation area 
to be cut from the full census tracts file. The 
area of these tracts and parts of tracts was 
calculated and then the dissolve tool was 
used to sum the total inundated area for 
each tract. The area of each tract and the 
part of the tract intersected by zero feet, 
four feet, and six feet of SLR was determined 
using the calculate geometry function. 
For each state, the Census and NOAA 
shapefiles were projected into the appro-
priate state plane to ensure accurate area 
measurements. Map projections convert 
geographic coordinates into linear mea-
surements, allowing for area and other 
calculations. Different projections are more 
or less appropriate for different areas, and 
Figure 2: Sea Level Rise along the Georgia Coast
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state plane projections are designed to be 
accurate for measurements within each US 
state. Large states often have multiple state 
planes. For this analysis, only Florida was af-
fected by this. References in this document 
to east, west, and north Florida refer to the 
counties within those state planes, as shown 
in Figure 3. 
Consideration of the inundation area at 0ft 
was necessary because census tracts are 
drawn to be contiguous and, therefore, 
include areas of water. Though certainly 
some other parts of each tract would not be 
inhabited, to simplify analysis, the assump-
tion was made that population is spread 
evenly across all dry areas. Therefore, the 
percentage of land lost was assumed to be 
equal to the percentage of population lost. 
This percentage was obtained by dividing 
the original tract area by the area covered 
by each SLR polygon and then subtracting 
the zero feet SLR water percentage from the 
four and six feet water percentages. Then, 
the potential number of total migrants from 
each area, i.e. those who would be likely to 
move due to the impacts of SLR, was cal-
culated by multiplying the projected 2050 
population of each tract by percentage of 
land lost at each SLR level.
Figure 3: Florida State Plane Systems
FL East State Plane
FL West State Plane
FL North State Plane
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It should be noted that data was missing 
for Florida’s five southernmost counties 
(Broward, Collier, Miami-Dade, Monroe, 
and Palm Beach) and a small area just off 
of the western coast of Citrus and Hernando 
Counties. The tract-level SLR analysis thus 
could not be completed for the five missing 
counties. Instead, for these southern Florida 
counties, land loss percentages for each SLR 
scenario were obtained from the Climate 
Central Surging Seas project, which made 
use of the same NOAA SLR data used in this 
analysis. The Surging Seas data also provid-
ed the number of people estimated to be 
living within 4 feet and 6 feet of sea level, as 
calculated from 2010 census blocks. 
This data allowed the same population 
growth and migration share calculations to 
be completed for these five counties as for 
all others in the study area. The small missing 
piece of sea level rise data off of Citrus and 
Hernando Counties was assumed to have 
less impact on accuracy because much of it 
lies over an area that is currently covered by 
water. The land loss estimate for this county 
is likely to be somewhat smaller than the 
real value.
Ultimately, there were ten values each for the 
outmigration share and Atlanta in-migration 
share for each county for each year from 
2003 – 2013. All of the values were averaged 
across the 10 year period to reduce year-to-
year fluctuations. The average outmigration 
share was multiplied by the total migration 
population to calculate the number of mi-





These formulas demonstrates how the po-
tential migrant totals were calculated:
Potential Atlanta Migrants(4ft SLR)
Potentially Displaced(4ft SLR) County’s Atlanta Out-migration Share
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The analysis assumes that these recent mi-
gration relationships will remain consistent 
through to 2050. This will lead to rather 
conservative results for two main reasons: 
the IRS SOI data do not cover all movers, 
only those filing taxes, so they underesti-
mate the actual migration relationships; and 
coastal counties have recently been growing 
more quickly than inland counties (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2013), which is unlikely to hold true once 
SLR impacts become more severe. Only 
the population projections differ from this 
conservative focus because it was outside 
the scope of this project to do more precise 
projections for each of the fifty counties 
under consideration.
The estimation of migration relationship 
was based on ten years of recent migration 
data due to, on the one hand, the desire to 
use more current population trends because 
of the distance projection date, and, on the 
other, the limitations of the project. A longer 
history of migration analysis would naturally 
be helpful in any expansion of this analysis 
as it may illustrate important, long-lasting 
relationships between Atlanta and some 
coastal cities. 
The methods used for this project are in-
tended to provide a first, hypothetical look at 
future SLR-driven migrations from the point 
of view of a destination city. As such, they 
are very preliminary. Further research in the 
field of migration and migration projections 
and broader data collection would certainly 
improve results. Still, the methods used here 
are worthwhile for their simplicity and ease 
of implementation to produce an initial 
estimate of in-movers and to shed light on 
the possible severity of the phenomenon of 
SLR-driven migration in the United States.
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Using the methods explained above, migra-
tion relationships, 2050 populations and mi-
gration totals, and sea level rise impact were 
calculated for each of the fifty southeastern 
coastal counties. This section describes the 
values found and their interactions, seeking 
to answer some of this project’s central ques-
tions. Migration relationship data is used to 
determine which cities may be most likely 
to send sea level rise driven migrants to the 
Atlanta area. Relative impact of sea level rise 
in each county is used to determine what 
level of damage each county could experi-
ence and the associated number of people 
who would be displaced. This information 
is combined to estimate a potential total 
number of Atlanta area in-migrants due to 
sea level rise.   
Atlanta’s Migration Relationships
Analysis of Atlanta’s relationship with sur-
rounding coastal counties shows higher 
levels of migration connection, first, to those 
counties closest to Atlanta and, second, to 
more urbanized counties. As Table 1 indi-
cates, Georgia coastal county connections 
tend to be higher than for any other coastal 
counties and, unsurprisingly, highest for 
Chatham and Glynn, the two counties with 
the highest populations on Georgia’s coast. 
This trend is also true for South Carolina and 
Alabama (though Alabama does have only 
two coastal counties). Despite the increased 
distance from Atlanta, the population cen-
ters of Miami, Palm Beach, and Tampa also 
send relatively high percentages of their 
migrants to Atlanta.
Results
Table 1: Top Ten Sending Counties (Out-Migration Share)
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Figure 4: Atlanta Out-Migration Shares
Lowest 20% of Counties
Highest 20% of Counties
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Because of their location along the coast, 
all of these counties will be impacted by 
sea level rise. Through the GIS analysis of 
NOAA’s SLR boundaries, the amount of 
land lost from coastal census tracts was 
estimated for 4 feet and 6 feet of sea level 
rise. Table 2 shows the counties which are 
expected to lose the most land due to sea 
level rise. Especially in southern Florida, 
many counties will see inundation in up 
to one fifth or one quarter of their land by 
2100, with some areas like the Keys, nearly 
disappearing completely. Even more land 
will be within only a couple feet of sea level, 
bringing much higher risk of flooding and 
storm surge to areas considered fairly safe 
today.
Table 2: Top Ten Counties by Percentage of Land Lost to Sea Level Rise
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Figure 5: Coastal County Land Loss Due to Sea Level Rise
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Potential In-Migrants
Using the migration patterns and sea level 
rise data described above, this project first 
attempts to estimate the number of people 
at high risk of displacement in 2050 and, 
subsequently, a potential number of sea lev-
el rise driven migrants who could come to 
the Atlanta region if those coastal residents 
choose or are forced to move. The projec-
tions made here rely on several assumptions 
made due to limited data. First, population 
growth over the 40 years between 2010 and 
2050 is assumed to be equal to the growth 
from 1970 to 2010 and was calculated using 
a linear growth model. The large study area 
prevented individual population growth 
projections for each county. Second, it was 
assumed that population is spread evenly 
across each census tract. In this case as well, 
the large study area prevented finer detail in 
the analysis.  
The number of potentially displaced is the 
total number of people, according to the 
growth projections made earlier, who will be 
living in the areas within four and six feet of 
sea level in 2050. Naturally, if sea level rise 
has already claimed some land by that time, 
people may no longer live in those places. 
This total is not meant to represent realistic 
populations in coastal tracts. It is an artificial 
construct of the total number of people 
who, if growth and settlement patterns were 
to remain the same, would likely need to 
find new places to reside by or before 2050. 
While the actual sea level in 2050 remains 
unknown, approximately four feet of rise is 
expected by 2100 (Walsh, J. D., et al., 2014). 
The four and six feet sea level rise scenarios 
were selected to best approximate a range 
of increased risk of damage not only from 
inundation, but also occasional flooding 
that will exist by 2050. Because the year-to-
year change in sea level remains uncertain, it 
was not possible to track this displacement 
across the next 35 years. Therefore, the 
methods used here essentially compress sea 
















































Table 3: Costal Populations and Potential Displacement
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Shown in Table 3, this results in a cumulative 
total of approximately 4 to 9.7 million peo-
ple at very high risk of displacement. This 
displacement area lies so close to the water 
that a major, Katrina-style storm will not be 
necessary to force people out. Instead, the 
slow advance of the water line, along with 
increased flooding, salt water intrusion, and 
other sea level rise side effects will damage 
homes, buildings, and infrastructure. The 
potentially displaced total given here is an 
estimate of the people who will be most 
exposed to these negative sea level rise 
impacts.
As these calculations were made using state 
plane geographic projections, Florida was 
divided into three parts. The Florida east 
state plane extends from Duval County, the 
seat of Jacksonville, FL, to Monroe County, 
which holds the Keys and the Everglades. 
The Florida west state plane includes the 
area between Lee and Levy Counties along 
the Gulf coast. The Florida north state plane 
extends from Dixie County to the Alabama 
boarder. 
Though these areas are not formal political 
boundaries in Florida, they demonstrate the 
relative importance of different areas of Flor-
ida in this sea level and migration context. 
Both the East and West geographic areas of 
Florida contribute, each, to the population 
of potentially displaced more than Alabama, 
Georgia, and South Carolina combined. 
The appropriate county Atlanta outmigra-
tion share was applied to the total number 
of potentially displaced in each census tract 
to find the total number of in-migrants to 
the Atlanta region. This results in a total of 
84,278 to 229,863 migrants from the fifty 
southeastern coastal counties in the study 
area. 
This does not include migrants who are 
likely to come to Atlanta from other areas 
inside these counties. In the past ten years 
these fifty counties have contributed ap-
proximately 103,400 residents to Atlanta. 
Netting out total in-migration to the Atlanta 
region from 2003-2013 to estimate future 






























Table 4: Potential Migrants to Atlanta, 2050
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total of 500,000 in-migrants from these 
fifty counties between 2013 and 2050. The 
IRS data used for migration analysis in this 
paper does not allow for tracking migration 
at sub-county levels. As some of the people 
in the displacement area would likely have 
chosen to move to Atlanta, regardless, the 
potential sea level rise migrants cannot 
simply be added to the total of all migrants 
from these counties. 
However, as residents of these counties who 
live outside of the displacement area should 
also be considered equally as likely to be 
a part of this 500,000 ‘business as usual’ 
migrant total, neither can the sea level rise 
migrants be assumed to fall completely 
within this projected migration total. The 
true share of this migration that the sea level 
rise migrants will make up is not possible 
to find using the methods in this project. It 
is possible to say, though, that the total of 
all migrants from southeastern counties by 
2050, whether choice or sea level rise driven, 
will fall above 500,000 and below 730,000 
and that the majority of those will come 
from Florida’s east coast. 
Risk of Increased Outmigration
Though many factors can influence the total 
number of migrants from any one area, the 
data collected for this analysis can also be 
used to help narrow down which coastal 
counties may be those most likely to send 
migrants to Atlanta due to sea level rise. 
Assuming that any county with a strong 
Atlanta out-migration share will retain that 
relationship and that those counties with 
higher land loss will be those likely to see 
higher levels of displacement, a simple 
model was constructed.
Counties were compared with a ranking 
system in which each factor, i.e. percentages 
of land lost and the outmigration flow share, 
was placed on ten point scales by deciles. 
The lowest 10% of outmigration counties, 
therefore, were assigned a value of 1 and the 
highest 10% a value of ten. As the analysis 
considers the extent of loss of coastal land, 
using acreage to rank SLR impact would push 
counties with larger amounts of coastal land 
to the top. In a large county, the acreage 
lost could be high, compared to a smaller 
county, while the overall percentage of land 
lost could remain small. Ranking counties 
by percent of land lost allowed them to be 
more accurately compared to one another.
Using ArcGIS’s raster calculator, the three 
scales were then combined with outmigra-
tion share and land loss weighted equally 
– 50% of the final value was outmigration 
share and 25% was assigned to each four 
feet and six feet SLR land loss – so the 
highest possible end value for each county 
was ten and the lowest was one. Results are 
shown in Table 5 and Figure 6. 
The highest possible risk score is ten. Un-
surprisingly, Miami-Dade County scored 
highest. With up to 77% of the county’s land 
either inundated or at high risk of flooding 
or storm surge damage, it is very likely that 
many Miami-Dade residents will move away 
in the future. Considering the strong existing 
Atlanta migration relationship, it is also likely 
that many of these migrants would choose 
Atlanta as their destination.
Though migrants are likely to come from 
all of the counties in the study area, those 
ranked highly here can be considered the 
counties to watch in terms of relative risk of 
displacement and impact on Atlanta in-mi-
grant totals. This is a fairly rough approxima-
tion, however. The model would certainly be 
improved through the use of more variables, 
such as density of important coastal infra-
structure and services (such as highways 
and hospitals) within the displacement area.
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For the most part, the coastal urban areas 
closest to Atlanta are those with the high-
est levels of future SLR migration. Even in 
southern Florida, however, areas of very high 
population are ranked highly. As total pop-
ulation was not taken into account in these 
calculations, this is an interesting result. It 
underlines the fact that urban areas tend to 
have stronger migration relationships with 
other  urban  areas  (Findlay, 2011).  Also 
important, it implies that migration move-
ments to the Atlanta area due to sea level 
rise may involve high numbers of people if 





















































 30    | Sea Level Rise and Migration








Sea Level Rise and Migration |    31
Discussion
Atlanta is a growing region: projecting the 
Atlanta Regional Commission’s future popu-
lation forecasts forward another ten years to 
2050 results in an Atlanta regional popula-
tion of about 9 million people. Therefore, at 
first glance, an estimate of 84,000 – 230,000 
sea level rise migrants does not seem over-
whelming compared with the likely number 
of overall Atlanta in-migrants or even the 
total number of migrants from this limited 
area, especially when considered over a 
period of 35 years. And, it is also important 
to note that in-migration in Atlanta is often 
balanced by outmigration, so this sea level 
migration total does not imply an absolute 
increase in population. Thus, it could be 
argued that the Atlanta region could absorb 
the coming sea level rise migrants with few 
problems. 
There are several good reasons to reject that 
argument, however. First of all, these mi-
grants are unlikely to distribute themselves 
equally across the region. While data were 
collected for migrants to all twenty of the 
counties in the Atlanta region (as defined by 
the 2000 Census), the majority of counties 
in this area did not receive the minimum ten 
migrants required to be listed in the IRS SOI 
files. 
Five Atlanta area counties, did, however, 
receive migrants from nearly all coastal 
counties in each year of the analysis: Clay-
ton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett. 
Across the ten years of migration data, 
these five counties received an average of 
about 81.8% of the region’s total incoming 
migrants from the fifty coastal counties ex-
amined here. If that relationship remains the 
same into 2050, these counties can expect 
to receive the great majority of sea level rise 
migrants to the region: 68,940 – 188,028 
new residents.
This indicates that, as part of the influx of 
former coastal residents, the Atlanta area 
could see a stronger trend of centralization 
of population due to sea level rise driven 
in-migration. Much higher demand for 
housing, jobs, places in schools, and other 
services would be seen within these counties 
as a result of this migration: there would be 
a comparatively higher impact in the center 
of the region than in the peripheral counties.
Second, the estimates given here consider 
only direct complications from sea level rise, 
such as coastal flooding, which happen in 
the immediate area, within a few feet, of 
the mean high water level. Studies show, 
though, that climate change will also lead 
to stronger hurricanes and tropical storms, 
so much greater areas, and therefore popu-
lations, would be at risk of displacement as 
a result of these storms (Walsh, J. D., et al., 
2014). If more people are displaced, more 
people will come to Atlanta, just as was seen 
after Hurricane Katrina. 
Based on the same IRS data used for this 
analysis, in the year after Katrina struck, 
the number of out-migrants from Orleans, 
Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes to 
any other parish or US county was nearly 
six times higher than the year before. The 
number of migrants choosing to come to 
the Atlanta region was 15 times higher. It is 
impossible to predict if or where a strong 
storm could strike, but it would undoubtedly 
have a major impact on the Atlanta region if 
it were to land somewhere among the fifty 
coastal counties considered here.
Also, the method of calculation of the poten-
tially displaced assumed that the percentage 
of land lost in each inundation scenario 
would match the percentage of population 
lost from a census tract. Some tracts will lose 
very high percentages of land, however,
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especially with six feet of sea level rise. There 
is likely to be a point at which so much of 
the important infrastructure, like schools, 
power substations, etc., inside a tract is lost 
or threatened with repeated damage that 
most or all of the people living in that tract 
will decide to move elsewhere, even if they 
themselves remain on higher and relatively 
safe ground. 
Finally, the number of sea level rise migrants 
predicted here relies on historical migration 
data. Migration patterns may change dras-
tically in the future, though. Currently, the 
share of people leaving one coastal county 
for another destination in the same state is 
very high. Across the ten years of migration 
data collected, for example, about 60% of 
the out-migrants from Miami-Dade County 
stayed within the state of Florida. By 2050 
this may simply no longer be possible. With 
3.6 to 9.2 million Florida residents at risk of 
displacement and considering the large ar-
eas of inundation and high flood risk across 
the state, available space for resettlement 
in state may be difficult to find. The share 
of migration to Atlanta could increase as a 
result. 
A further concern is the structure of the mi-
gration to Atlanta. As coastal residents are 
inconvenienced by nuisance flooding and 
infrastructure damage, they will begin to re-
treat, and some will choose Atlanta as their 
destination. Once more serious flooding 
and damage from storms make it clear that 
residents, their property, their jobs, or their 
businesses are no longer safe or reliable on 
the coast, they will be forced to move and 
many will end up in Atlanta. So, while the 
migration is likely to begin slowly, severe SLR 
impacts, like increased storm surge damage 
in a large city, could cause it to accelerate 
unexpectedly. Some migrants are likely to 
resemble traditional choice migrants, taking 
time to plan and prepare for a move, while 
others may be more like refugees with little 
time and few resources to shape a new life 
in a new city.
Therefore, Atlanta should be concerned 
about the accumulation of SLR migrants 
over time during the middle part of the 
century, accompanied by spikes in the SLR 
migrant numbers with major coastal storms. 
Historical migration relationships indicate 
that the closest urban coastal counties in the 
Southeast and the Miami area are both most 
likely to send migrants to Atlanta for any 
reason. When risk of SLR impact is included, 
this relationship remains true: coastal cities 
in Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and 
the Miami area are all most likely to send sea 
level rise driven migrants to the Atlanta area. 
This likelihood speaks to the long-term ac-
cumulation: over time, Atlanta is likely to see 
increasing numbers of residents from these 
areas as SLR impacts develop. For shorter 
term influxes due to disasters, population 
of the origin is of more importance. Table 6 
shows the counties sending the highest ab-
solute numbers of migrants from the 2050 
calculations. As this demonstrates, though 
they have lower overall likelihood of sending 
migrants, many highly populated counties 
in Florida would still send a significant num-
ber of people to the Atlanta area in cases of 
large displacements. 
Choice migrants from the coast can be in-
corporated into existing planning processes 
at the local level. With adequate information 
on numbers and characteristics, appro-
priate steps can be taken to absorb these 
newcomers, who are likely to have planned 
their own resettlement in advance. Those 
coastal residents displaced due to disasters 
will pose a different challenge. They are 
likely to come in higher numbers and with 
little preparation. Their long term housing 
options, transportation, healthcare, and 
employment needs will need to be sorted 
out after they arrive.
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Policy Concerns
In any attempt to understand sea level 
rise, it is important for planners and deci-
sion-makers to be aware of these types of 
migration relationships and Atlanta’s role, 
as a nearby inland city, as refuge for many 
seeking to escape the impacts of sea level 
rise. Regional and local governing bodies 
in Atlanta and the state of Georgia should 
recognize the potential for major future 
population movements in the Southeast 
and prepare for them. Steps should be taken 
to streamline the process of integration into 
the Atlanta area for new residents, including 
planning for increased in-migration, consid-
ering the needs of potential future migrants, 
and accepting a role in coastal adaptation 
and disaster preparation. 
Currently, most of the local and county 
governments in the Atlanta region lack 
formal climate change plans. Those that 
have adopted climate change plans, such as 
the City of Atlanta and the Atlanta Regional 
Commission (ARC), mention only emissions 
reduction and water consumption. Others, 
like Fulton County, have, at most, Earth Day 
initiatives. This focus only on reducing, in-
crementally, the region’s contribution to the 
drivers of climate change is insufficient. The 
expansion of general climate change plan-
ning efforts is very important at the local 
and regional levels to ensure more cohesive 
action on impacts rooted locally, such as 
heat waves, drought, and air quality, and on 
those coming from external pressures, such 
as migration. Planning work around climate 
change needs to expand from mitigation to 
adaptation concerns.
Table 6: Top Ten Total Migrant-Sending Counties, 2050
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An important first step is to include consider-
ation of potential climate-driven migrants in 
future population projections for the Atlanta 
area. Housing prices can be expected to in-
crease due to higher demand. The number 
of new residents will also stress the local 
education, healthcare, and transportation 
systems. Bearing in mind that the majority of 
the migrants to the region are likely to move 
into only five counties, impacts in these 
areas will be more severe. Further research 
is needed into how migration movements 
may develop in relationship to sea level rise 
at a smaller scale, such as within significant 
sending cities like Miami, and into how 
migrants will make choices about when and 
where to move. This information needs to be 
incorporated beyond disaster management, 
into future scenario plans, transportation 
models, and land use decisions.
Planning organizations making future pop-
ulation predictions, such as the ARC, need 
to take on a leading role in this work. The 
projections they make are used for compre-
hensive planning efforts in most counties in 
the region and the ARC’s regional goals help 
shape transportation and land use decisions 
with far-reaching impact. Already, planning 
horizons reach 2040 – a time when sea level 
rise driven migration will have begun. All of 
the ARC’s formal, regional-scope planning 
documents – not just those on the subject 
of climate or environmental concerns – 
should discuss coastal in-migration and its 
benefits and risks. In their role as a research 
and guidance organization for smaller local 
governments, the ARC should take on the 
responsibility of further investigating sea 
level rise driven migration and of educating 
local counties and municipalities about po-
tential types of migration flows. For example, 
information about the size of populations at 
risk of displacement should be shared along 
with county-specific estimates of potential 
in-migration. 
Working together with local counties and 
cities, the ARC should help planners deter-
mine where strong migration relationships 
exist. This can help shape a long-term 
in-migration timeline and a short-term 
displacement likelihood map. From there, 
the City of Atlanta and/or some of the large 
central counties expected to see much of the 
growth should include sea level rise driven 
in-migration in their plans. For longer-term 
gradual inflows of coastal residents, they 
should consider how increases in population 
will affect transportation investments, hous-
ing availability, and school enrollment. 
Special attention should also be paid here 
to the displaced, who will require services 
some governments may not be expecting, 
such as temporary housing or public transit. 
The Atlanta Fulton County Emergency Man-
agement Agency and other local emergency 
management agencies should expand local 
disaster response plans to include disasters 
affecting these high migration likelihood 
populations. Disaster preparation should 
include some level of stress testing of im-
portant service and infrastructure resilience 
to large influxes of people. These agencies 
should educate local rental agencies and 
landlords about the needs and funding for 
displaced persons, which may help minimize 
some of the housing access problems dis-
placed New Orleans residents experienced 
in other states.
By identifying the high likelihood origin 
locations of migrants, Georgia counties 
and cities can build a profile of the char-
acteristics of likely migrant groups, such 
income, age, education, car ownership, etc., 
which will help them anticipate migrants’ 
needs. Partnerships between the Atlanta 
region and specific high sending likelihood 
counties would support this work. Focused 
relationship-building with coastal counties 
could have economic benefits as well. The 
Atlanta region could capitalize on its role as
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a city of refuge through marketing to coastal 
businesses and industries which may see 
interruptions due to sea level rise. Atlanta 
– as the resettlement location likely to be 
preferred by many coastal residents – could 
also house satellite offices for important 
management and logistics concerns which 
need to be isolated from coastal risks. 
Action on sea level rise driven migration 
will be required above the local level, too. 
State governments will need to pay more 
attention to these concerns. Many of the 
people displaced because of Hurricane 
Katrina found that the bureaucratic aspects 
of their displacement were often the largest 
obstacle to settling easily in new cities (Fo-
thergill & Peek, 2004; Lein, L., et al., 2012; 
Pardee, Jessica, 2012; Weber, Lynn, 2012). 
As larger migration movements between 
different southeastern states become more 
common, these problems will only be exac-
erbated. The Atlanta region and the state of 
Georgia should seek, wherever possible, to 
standardize and coordinate administrative 
actions related to Medicaid, food stamps, 
and other public assistance application 
processes and requirements. Professional 
licensing standards, i.e. for teachers, nurses, 
contractors, cosmetologists, etc., should be 
made more consistent or, ideally, a South-
east regional licensing process should be 
pursued. This will help improve employment 
rates for migrants and, especially in the case 
of teachers, nurses, and contractors, help 
ensure that new populations are more eas-
ily absorbed. These changes should begin 
as soon as possible with the goal to have 
coordinated systems in place before serious 
climate migration begins.
State-level southeast regional partnerships 
should be developed to encourage cooper-
ation and information sharing. For example, 
it will be important to gain access to fraud 
and crime databases as people who may 
have a criminal background or major mental 
health issues move across state lines. Access 
to other records, like school enrollment and 
vaccinations, from local departments of ed-
ucation and health will also help streamline 
migrant resettlement.
Engagement by all Southeast states and 
regional governments will be necessary for 
issues such as coastal adaptation projects 
and disaster preparation and response. State 
emergency management agencies should 
coordinate disaster response actions, such 
as evacuations that may need to extend 
across state lines. Inland areas like Atlanta 
will not be completely immune to sea level 
rise impacts merely because they themselves 
will not experience the flooding; this issue 
connects the entire region and requires 
cooperation and collective action. 
If Georgia and the Atlanta region want to 
avoid many of the negative impacts that 
large waves of migrants could bring, then 
they much support actions on the coast 
that will reduce the risks of sea level rise and 
support resiliency in coastal communities. 
Right now, this will involve cooperation on 
the part of many state departments, in-
cluding environmental protection and local 
governments pursuing hard and soft barrier 
construction, such as sea walls and barrier 
island renourishment. Development of state 
climate adaptation agencies could support 
improved actions at a broad level. These 
agencies could push for adaptation-focused 
policies and guide the work of the various 
state departments. Though it remains un-
certain that state-level climate adaptation 
agencies will be created in the southeast 
anytime soon, these types of organizations 
would be especially helpful in bringing to-
gether work on physical and human impact 
issues related to climate change. The most 
benefit, at larger scale, would come if they 
work together rather than in competition 
against one another for funding for coastal 
adaptation projects.
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After Hurricane Katrina, the problems of 
large internal population displacements in 
the US were demonstrated on a large scale. 
Yet, concerns about this issue have faded 
into the background since. Inland cities, 
like Atlanta, have not yet begun to include 
future climate-driven migration in their fu-
ture plans. Little doubt that such migration 
will happen should exist, however. Research 
shows that people living along the US coast 
are increasingly vulnerable to the effects of 
sea level rise (Cutter et al., 2003; National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2013). As flooding and other risks increase, 
these coastal residents will become increas-
ingly likely to leave their homes (Colten, 
2006; Sweet & Park, 2014). Still, there has 
been little investigation in the US of where 
these people may choose to move and how 
that may impact inland areas.
This project focused on the potential of sea 
level rise driven migration to the Atlanta, 
Georgia region and attempted to estimate 
a conservative number of sea level rise mi-
grants that the area could expect to receive 
by 2050. Assuming that coastal settlement 
in the southeast continues at historical rates 
and that existing migration relationships be-
tween the coastal counties and the Atlanta 
region remain constant, sea level rise driven 
migrants to the Atlanta area could total 
between about 84,000 and 230,000 by 2050. 
At least 65,000 to 188,000 can be expected 
in the five central Atlanta counties: Clayton, 
Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett. Most 
migrants will come from the areas around 
Miami, the largest concentration of coastal 
population in the southeast and a city with 
a historically strong migration relationship 
with the Atlanta region.
While any attempt to estimate an accurate 
number of SLR migrants to Atlanta relies on 
many assumptions which may not remain 
true in the future, a projected total was vital 
to demonstrate the seriousness of this issue. 
Every effort was made to ensure that the es-
timations were based on historical data and 
as conservative as possible, so, while they 
may easily be debated, the intention was to 
provide a low end projection. With about 4 
to 9.1 million people at risk of displacement 
across the fifty counties of the southeast 
coast, it is very likely that the total number 
of SLR migrants could be higher than the 
estimate given here. Especially if few coastal 
adaptation projects are pursued and if one 
or more major population centers were to be 
hit by a large hurricane, very high numbers 
of migrants are likely to come to Atlanta.
Local governments in Atlanta are not yet 
planning for climate migration to the area, 
however. Clearly there is a need for in-
creased understanding of the issue and of 
education about possible migrant groups, 
their size, and possible local impacts. The 
Atlanta Regional Commission should take 
action now to include climate migration in 
their population forecasts for the region, as 
these totals are used widely by local cities 
and counties for land use and transporta-
tion decision-making. Additional housing 
with public transportation access may be 
needed, especially in the five central Atlanta 
counties. 
State and local emergency management 
agencies should research past hurricanes 
and coastal disasters to learn how large 
migration waves develop and apply this 
information to their preparedness and 
response planning efforts. Systems for 
professional licensure and applications for 
public assistance should be coordinated, 
if not standardized, at the regional level. 
Finally, a focus on climate adaptation, in-
cluding consideration of migration, should 
be  incorporated into planning at all levels. If
Conclusion
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possible, this should be supported by the 
creation of state climate adaptation agen-
cies to oversee the work of other, related 
departments. 
Even further action will certainly be neces-
sary. The threat that sea level rise poses to 
the Southeast coast is, at this point, inescap-
able. With 39% of the total US population 
living on the coast (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2013), dis-
placement is a major concern around the 
country, including in the coastal areas close 
to Atlanta. Significant numbers of people 
can be expected to move inland and Atlanta 
is a logical destination for many who have 
strong social and cultural connections in the 
region or who are seeking the closest large 
city for better opportunities. Action to slow 
climate change and to adapt to sea level 
rise could reduce the number of potentially 
displaced persons and the subsequent 
number of migrants, but there is little doubt 
that many people will still be required to 
move. Atlanta cannot afford to ignore their 
numbers or their potential impact on local 
services and infrastructure.
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